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pressing need for recapitalization renders the same considerations inapplicable
here. It should be held that scaling-down of accumulations is justifiable only
where it results in the benefits to the preferred shareholders discussed above.
Too much consideration should not be given to the improbability that accruals
will ever be paid,9 or broad and unsubstantiated statements concerning benefits
to the corporation as a whole.
It has also been suggested that recapitalization could be more effectively
supervised by an administrative board. ° Commissioner Douglas of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission recently announced that the Commission will ask
for power to regulate, among other things, reorganization proceedings. 6' It
might be a desirable substitute for state action to authorize the Securities
Exchange Commission to supervise recapitalization to the extent that such
supervision would be constitutional. In the absence of legislation providing for
supervision by court or administrative board, the protection of accumulations,
like other problems of minority security holders, must await either the creation
of an association like the British Shareholders Protective Association,62 or a
changed business morality.
Commentators have pointed out the undesirability of non-cumulative pre-
ferred stock.63 That this feeling is shared by the investing public is evidenced
by the fact that such securities are not highly regarded on the market.14 We
have seen that in many instances the cumulative provision is not only of no
practical value, but is misleading. Therefore, unless the accumulations are
fully protected, the desirability of any type of preferred stock as an investment
is doubtful.
INDUSTRIAL STRIKEBREAKING-THE BYRNES ACT
Articulate opinion of industrial strikebreaking has been almost unanimously
hostile.' There is now little question of the desirability of government inter-
ference if a law can be drawn which is both constitutional and effective. In its
broadest sense strikebreaking has taken three principal forms: (i) Replace-
ments. The most nearly justifiable form. Employers insist that they are merely
s9 See Windhurst v. Central Leather Co., ioi N.J. Eq. 543, 138 AtI. 772 (1927).
6o See 46 Yale L. J. 985, ioo3 (i937).
61 Chicago Tribune, April i8, I937, pt. 2, p. 7, col. 6.
62 See Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1305, 1330 (1934).
63 See Lattin, Is Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock in Fact Preferred, 25 Ill. L. Rev. 148,
64 (1930); 74 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 6o5, 6o8 (1926). But see Berle, Non-Cumulative Preferred
Stock, 23 Col. L. Rev. 358 (1923).
64 Professor Berle has called non-cumulative stock the "waif of the stock exchanges." Berle,
op. cit. supra note 63, at 358.
x See, generally, 85 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 406 (1937); Levinson, I Break Strikes (1935), ii
Fortune $6 (Jan. 1935), 90 New Republic 227 (Mar. 31, 1937). But see Pinkerton, Strikers,
Communists, Tramps, and Detectives (1878).
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hiring new workers in the places of those who quit. The "finks" or new em-
ployees, however, are provided by the strikebreaking organization merely for
the duration of the strike and, in the main, have neither the intention nor the
ability to stay permanently.2 Furthermore, they are nearly always accompanied
by the less peaceable "guards."3 (2) Armed guards or shock troops. The most
spectacular form. Ranging from a few door guards to protect the "finks" to
highly-militarized armies with complete arsenals, sometimes nearly equalling
the number of workers,4 the guards are prepared for violence, and are never
disappointed. Extraordinarily expensive to the employer,5 they easily pay for
themselves, apparently, in demolished morale of the labor organization and in
retention or even lowering of the previous wage scale.' It is important to
recognize that their violence is not restricted to the employer's premises. They
are employed, really, not to protect the property but to destroy the union, and
this is not accomplished by gently removing trespassers. Recruitment is largely
among criminals and bums in a few big cities.7 (3) Industrial spies. Less
spectacular and violent than armed guards but far more dangerous to organized
labor. These spies join and even frequently control the unions. Theyprecipitate
untimely strikes or demonstrations and keep the employers fully informed on
union activity.8 In this way employers are able not only to upset specific plans
but also to cripple the union by discharging the leaders, and many powerful
unions have been destroyed because the members were not willing to attend
meetings obviously open to the employer's men. 9 The current investigation by
the LaFollette "Civil Liberties" Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Education and Labor indicates that hardly a large industry is free from spies."'
To attack these varied problems by law is exceedingly difficult, and with the
2 In a New York strike, an employer's spokesman stated that out of 20,000 strikebreakers
hired as replacements, only 15% would make desirable employees. See ii Fortune 56, 89, 92
(Jan. 1935).
3 88 New Republic 242 (Oct. 7, 1936).
4 go New Republic 227, 229 (March 31, 193'7). The National Metal Trades Association
guarantees to its members, strikebreakers, up to 70% of their employees.
s An investigator for the labor board placed industry's annual bill for breaking up union
organization at eighty million dollars. See 143 Nation 209 (Aug. 22, i936).
6 Basso, Strike-Buster: Man among Men, 8i New Republic 124 (Dec. 12, 1934); 11 For-
tune 56, 89 (Jan. 1935).
7 143 Nation 381 (Oct. 3, 1936). See also ii Fortune 56, 89 (Jan. 1935).
8 Mr. Heber Blankenhorn, industrial economist of the National Labor Relations Board,
quoted an estimate that three detective agencies have recently employed 135,ooo industrial
spies, and their income has amounted to $6o,oooooo a year. 123 Literary Digest 5 (March 27,
1937); go New Republic 227 (March 31, 1937); i44 Nation 238 (Feb. 27, 1937). See also
In the Matter of Brown Shoe Co., Inc., a Corporation, and Boot and Shoe Workers Union,
Local No. 655, case no. c-2o. i Decisions and Orders of the National Labor Relations Board
803 (1936).
9 90 New Republic 227 (March 31, 1937).
10 123 Literary Digest 5, 6 (March 27, 1937).
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possible exception of the Wagner National Labor Relations Act"x nearly all
attempts have been fruitless. Nine states prohibit the importation of armed
guards, 2 but these statutes are not only not enforced, but they cannot prevent
the separate importation of arms and guards, 3 and they do not touch the
problem of spies and finks. Nor is the latter problem attacked by the few
statutes imposing residence and other requirements upon persons seeking to be
deputized as sheriffs.X4 Non-deputies have more difficulty in obtaining firearm
licenses, but the difficulty is not insurmountable. Moreover, license statutes are
not well enforced, and non-explosive weapons such as baseball bats and steam
have proved effective.'1 An idealistic effort to attack finks and spies as well as
guards has been made in fourteen state statutes which compel employers and
agencies to make full disclosure to prospective strikebreakers; 6 apparently a
surprising amount of strikebreaking is accomplished by men who only gradually
become aware of their function.17 But all these statutes are obviously fragmen-
tary, and they have not solved the problem. In Wisconsin an industrial spy-
and agency-licensing statute,," requiring the filing of heavy bonds against
possible damage and providing severe penalties for failure to register, is sup-
posed to have discouraged strikebreaking.19 There is no adequate definition of
"spy," however, and no data on the enforcement of this act is at hand. A
certain amount of action by state administrative officers has been effective,"'
" 49 Stat. 452 (1935); 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 157-66 (1935).
- Crawford & Moses' Ark. Dig. Stat. 1921, §§ 2792, 2793; Colo. Ann. Stat. 1930, § 4481;
Baldwin's Carroll's Ky. Stat. 1930, § 1376; Mo. Rev. Stat. 1929, §4237; Mont. Rev. CodeAnn.,
1935, § 10925; Neb. Comp. Stat. 1929, § 28-725; Okla. Stat. 1931, § zo88i; Tenn. Code Ann.
1932, § 1x365; Wis. Stat. 1931, §§ 348, 472.
Z See Witte, The Government in Labor Disputes 211 (932).
14 Crawford and Moses' Ark. Dig. Stat. 1921, §§ 2790, 2791; Ill. State Bar Stats. 1935,
C. 125, §§ 28, 29; Ky. Stat. i93o, § 1376; Mass. Gen. L. 1932, C. 149, § 176; Mo. Rev. Stat.
1929, § 4233; Neb. Comp. Stat. 1929, § 28-726; Cahill's N.Y. Cons. L. 1930, C. 41, § 1845;
i8 Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann. 1930, § 871; Tex. Comp. Stat. 1928, art. 5207; W. Va. Code Ann.
1932, § 6037; Wis. Stat. i93i, § 66.11(1).
XS ee 88 New Republic 242 (Oct. 7, 1936) for description of tactics used by large employers
in industrial disputes.
16 Cal. Gen. L. 193o, act 4728; Colo. Ann. Stat. 1930, § 4479, 448o; Me. Rev. Stat. 1930,
C. 54, §§ 7, 8; Mass. Gen. L. 1932, C. 149, §§ 22, 23; Minn. Stat. 1927, §§ 10392, 10393; Mont.
Rev. Code Ann. 1935, §§ 11220, 11222; Nev. Comp. L. 1929, §§ 2772, 2774; N.H. Pub. L.
1926, c. 176, §§ 36, 37, 38, 39; Ohio Ann. Code 1934, § 89603 (d); 43 Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann.
193i, §§ 607, 608; Tenn. Code Ann. 1932, §§ 11363, 11364; Wis. Stat. i931, § 103-43.
17 9 News Week, no. 6, p. ii (Feb. 6, 1937); for a fictionalized account see Zara, Give Us
This Day 386 ff. (1936).
is Wis. Stat. 1931, § 175-07.
19 Witte, op. cit. supra note 13.
29 Milwaukee city officials put i5o Bergoff men in jail when they attempted to break the
traction strike in 1934. In 1934, Governor Talmadge of Georgia stopped the activities of
Bergoff strikebreakers by taking troops into strike areas. It is not clear whether Governor
Talmadge stopped the strikebreaking or merely superseded the strikebreakers. See i i Fortune
56, 92 (Jan. 1935); 8r New Republic 124, 125 (Dec. 12, 1934).
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but even that has been crippled by the courts,2 and it has never attacked spies.
Frequently action by state administrative or executive officers increases the
violence, and it is usually indistinguishable from the strikebreaking itself.
Federal attack on strikebreaking originated in 1915 with President Wilson's
Commission on Industrial Relations.2 The committee's report was extremely
hostile and contained a number of specific suggestions for legislation. It advo-
cated: (i) Abolition in interstate commerce of private detective agencies,
practically all of which are primarily strikebreaking organizations; (2) Impo-
sition of severe restrictions on deputizing sheriffs, such as prohibition of non-
resident or ex-convict deputies and pay from private sources; (3) Criminal
penalties for transportation of men across state lines either with arms or with
the intention of arming them. Nothing was done with the commission's re-
port until the Wagner National Labor Relations Act 23 in 1935 and the Byrnes
Strikebreakers Act24 in 1936. Although it does not specifically mention the
problem, perhaps really because of its generality, it is probable that the Wag-
ner Act can be used to combat strikebreaking more effectively than anything
before devised. Section 8 (1) of the Wagner Act makes it an unfairlabor practice
to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce" employees in the exercise of their rights
to organize or bargain collectively. No doubt all three forms of strikebreaking
are properly within this definition. 2S But the Wagner Act has two weaknesses
in attacking strikebreaking: (i) There are no criminal penalties, 6 and unless
there is the threat of ex post facto prosecution, damage will be done before it
can be stopped. (2) The act applies only to employers, leaving the powerful
agencies untouched.
The Byrnes Act avoids the two faults of the Wagner Act but has few of its
virtues. The text follows:
Whoever shall knowingly transport or cause to be transported, or aid or abet in
transporting, in interstate or foreign commerce, any person with intent to employ
such person to obstruct or interfere, in any manner, with the right of peaceful picketing
during any labor controversy affecting wages, hours, or condition of labor, or the right
of organization for the purpose of collective bargaining, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony and shall be punishable by a fine not exceeding $5ooo, or by imprisonment not
exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court. 7
21 Mayor enjoined from ousting guards and replacements. American Steel and Wire Co. v.
Davis, 26i Fed. 8oo (D.C., Ohio igg); Schenectady Ry. Co. v. Whitmeyer, I2I Misc. 4, 199
N.Y.S. 827 (1923). Governor enjoined from military intervention in strike. Strutwear
Knitting Co. v. Olson, 13 F. Supp. 384 (Minn. 1936), noted in 3 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 6 55 (1936).
2245 Current History 77, 78-80 (Feb. 1937).
23 See note ii supra. 24 49 Stat. 1899 (1936); i8 U.S.C.A. § 407a (supp. 1936).
" Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 58 Sup. Ct. - (1937).
26 The Railway Labor Act, which sets up mediation procedure similar to that of the Wagner
Act, has substantial criminal penalties. 44 Stat. 577 (1926); 45 U.S.C.A. § I52-tenth (supp.
1936). These provisions have not been tested for constitutionality. See note 5o infra.
27 See note 23 subpra.
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In the avoidance of constitutional difficulties, both under the commerce
clause of Article One and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, some
care was apparently taken in the drafting of the act.28 It is a safe generalization
that an activity is within the commerce power if it has a "direct effect" upon
interstate commerce.29 But it is apparent that what would be a direct effect in
an activity involving the transportation of things is not necessarily a direct
effect in one involving transportation of people. 30 It is usually argued that a
regulation involving the transportation of people across state lines is properly
within the commerce power where the transportation is the essential activity
attacked.31 In the basebalPs' and vaudeville33 cases it was contended that the
Sherman Act applied to combinations monopolizing certain exhibitions. Here,
thought the Court, although some interstate travel was unavoidable, the essen-
tial activity was the stationary exhibition. In the Mann Act cases, 34 however,
Congress had expressly made the transportation the essential activity from its
point of view, and this it could do under the commerce power even though the
undoubted intent was to prevent the objectionable ultimate use of the woman
transported.35 As an apology for this curious reasoning it is sometimes suggested
that white slave traffic is either more evil in some sense than amusement
monopolies, and hence less deserving of protection, or more peculiarly needful
of federal regulation. Just how this applies to the "nonpecuniary interstate
fornication" of the Caminetti case is unclear. At any rate the Byrnes Act seems
fairly safe under all of these apparently irrelevant criteria. With elaborate care
the framers made interstate transportation the essential activity,36 the ultimate
25 See H.R. Rep. no. 2431, 74 th Cong., 2d Sess. p. 2 (I936).
29 Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 397 (1912); Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648,
655 (1894); United Leather Workers v. Herkert, 265 U.S. 457, 464-67 (1924).
30 Compare International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 9I (19io), with Federal Baseball
Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). Compare Binderup v. Pathe News Exchange,
263 U.S. 291 (1923) with Hart v. Keith Vaudeville Exchange, 262 U.S. 271 (1923). See also
Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (i9o3); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (i912).
31 Passenger Cases, 7 How. (U.S.) 282, 429 (1849); Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 69i (i88o);
Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204 (1893).
3' Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
33 Hart v. Keith Vaudeville Exchange, 262 U.S. 271 (1923); Hart v. Keith Vaudeville
Exchange, 12 F.(2d) 341 (C.C.A. 2d 1926).
34 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (I917); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308
(1913).
3 "... .. a person may move or be moved in interstate commerce, and the act under
consideration was drawn in view of that possibility." Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 3o8,
320 (1913). See also Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936) (Federal Kidnapping Act
held constitutional); Champion v. Ames, i88 U.S. 32 (1903) (prohibition of interstate trans-
portation of lottery tickets held constitutional); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S.
45 (1911) (Pure Food Act held constitutional). In Ky. Whip & Collar Co. v. Ill. Cent. R. Co.,
57 Sup. Ct. 277 (1937), special emphasis was put upon "evils" irrelevant to the transportation.
36 See H. R. Rep. no. 2431, 7 4 th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2 (1936).
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strikebreaking appearing (as in the Mann Act) only as a factor in the intent of
the accused at the time of transportation. A few brief glimpses of the horrors of
strikebreaking should convince the Court of its "evil." And the immensity of
some of the strikebreaking organizations bears voluble testimony to the need
for federal regulation.37
Similar care has been used to avoid due process difficulties. While the ques-
tion is largely unexplored, there is considerable evidence that courts will not
countenance too great restriction upon employers' right to self-help against
labor. An employer has a constitutional right to hire persons, no matter where
they reside, to operate his factory.38 He also has a right to protect his property
against violence and destruction.39 To deprive him of these would clearly be in
violation of "due process." On the other hand, peaceful picketing and the right
of organization have been recognized as proper labor activities.40 Interpretation
of these generalities has gradually come to favor labor. In spite of the admitted
propriety of labor organizations, it was not until the upholding of the federal
Railway Labor Act in 19304r that the federal courts admitted a constitutional
power to restrain employers from using coercion against unions. The Erdman
Act of J898,42 making it criminal for interstate carriers to discharge or dis-
criminate against employees for union activity, was invalidated in Adair v.
United States.43 One of the grounds was that it was a violation of the due process
clause to compel any person in the course of his business and against his will to
accept or retain the personal services of an employee for whatever reasons he
might have. The effect of this decision was greatly reduced by Texas & N.O.R.
v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks,4 which upheld a section of the
Railway Labor Act providing that railroad employees, in designating their
representatives for collective bargaining, were entitled to enjoin the "inter-
ference, influence, or coercion" of their employers.45 The Adair case was dis-
tinguished on the ground that the statute in question did not interfere with the
"normal exercise of the right" of the employer to select and discharge employees,
but that it prevented only the influencing of free choice of representatives to
promote collective bargaining.46 The same distinction was made in Virginian
37 See note 8 supra.
38 Schenectady Ry. Co. v. Whitmeyer, 121 Misc. 4, 199 N.Y.S. 827 (1923).
39 American Steel and Wire Co. v. Davis, 261 Fed. 8oo (D.C. Ohio igig).
40 See Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction, 33, 181-82, 207-8 (1930); American
Foundries v. Tri-City Council, 257 U.S. 184, 203, 206-7 (1921); Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4
Metc. (Mass.) ii1 (184o).
4X44 Stat. 577 (1926); Texas & N.O.R. v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks,
281 U.S. 548 (1930).
42 30 Stat. 424, c. 370 (1898).
43 208 U.S. 161 (I908). A similar state statute was later invalidated on substantially the
same grounds in Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. i (1914).
44 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
4s44 Stat. 577 (1926). 46 281 U.S. 548, 571. See 4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 109, 117 (1936).
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Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40,47 which upheld the amended Railway
Labor Act.48 Finally, in the Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. case49 it was held
constitutional to prohibit an employer from in any way encouraging or dis-
couraging membership in a labor organization. Today, little remains of the
rule in the Adair case.
It will be noted, however, that there is no case since the Adair and Coppage
cases which involved criminal provisions. In the Adair case the rule of absolute
freedom to contract was qualified "by the fundamental condition that no
contract .... can be sustained which the law, upon reasonable grounds,
forbids as inconsistent with the public interests .... ,,so Since the penalties
were there struck down, this phrase may be taken to make a distinction between
"forbid" and "make criminal." One possible justification for the distinction is
the rule in International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky.S' Where the terms of a
criminal statute are excessively vague, it will be unconstitutional because no
workable criterion is created for avoiding the penalties. Similar statutes pro-
viding for injunctions and rendering contracts unenforceable are unobjection-
able because in the former there will be no enforcement until a court sets up
definite standards and in the latter the penalty is not so great.52 To obtain some
idea of the uncertainty of the rule of the International Harvester case, compare
Nash v. United States,S3 in which the rule of reason was held not to render the
criminal provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law too vague.
It is difficult to say how much the apparent attempt to avoid constitutional
difficulties has crippled the Byrnes Act. It has frequently been suggested that
the phrase, "peaceful picketing," is a contradiction in terms, and although it is
now generally supposed to have some meaning, its scope has been so limited
that it is almost non-existent5 4 Whether the trend will be reversed in view of
the recent Wagner Act decisionsss is conjectural. The Byrnes Act, of course,
refers to peaceful picketing only as a factor in the intent of the defendant at the
time of transportation, and the intent will be unexpressed. Suppose there is
both peaceful and non-peaceful picketing or only non-peaceful picketing. Will
the inference be that there is no intent to interfere with whatever peaceful
47 57 Sup. Ct. 592, 605 (1937).
4848 Stat. 1186 (1934); 45 U.S.C.A. § 152(3) (1935).
49 58 Sup. Ct. - (937).
S0 208 U.S. 161, 172 (19o8).
51 234 U.S. 216 (i914)..
51 See, for example, Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717, 719-21 (1914); i U.S.C.A.
§§ 41-51 (1927).
S3 229 U.S. 373 (1913).
5Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Gee, 139 Fed. 582 (C.C. Iowa 1905). See Cooper, The Fiction
of Peaceful Picketing, 35 Mich. L. Rev. 72 (1936).
ss National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 58 Sup. Ct. - (2937);
National Labor Relations Board v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 58 Sup. Ct. - (1937); and ac-
companying cases.
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picketing might arise? It is clear that peaceful picketing may momentarily
become non-peaceful, and especially that it may be made so by judicious
strikebreaking tactics. Can it successfully be urged that there is no adequate
showing of intent merely from transportation aimed at a strike where there is
peaceful picketing? Or on the other hand, since strikebreakers' lack of dis-
crimination is notorious, would there be an inference of intent merely from the'
transportation regardless of the type of strike aimed at? If so, the requirement
would be superfluous, except for its function in warding off the commerce
clause. It is more likely, however, that the requirement will work positive
injury, that it will lead the courts to demand specific, separate evidence of
intent.
The phrase "right of organization" is more important, not only because the
intent to interfere therewith should be easier to prove but because it is ap-
parently aimed at spies and replacements as well as guards. It should be
noticed, however, that the statute is ambiguous in this respect. The phrase
could either be the object of the preposition "with," and thus be co-ordinate
with "right of peaceful picketing," or the object of the participle, "affecting,"
and merely purposive of the "peaceful picketing." It would seem that the
former is correct, nof only because the latter would reduce the act to a nullity
but because there is otherwise no function for the word, "or," before "condition
of labor." This ambiguity can be dispelled by the insertion of another "with"
before "the right of organization." Thus interpreted, the chief difficulties with
the phrase lie in ascribing some function to the word, "right," and in determin-
ing whether "organization" merely refers to the act of assembling a union or also
includes the maintenance of the union and pursuance of its aims. In view of
the federal courts' traditional hostility to labor, the stricter construction is by
no means impossible. Under it the impediment to any of the three forms of
strikebreaking would be negligible. Most of the spies' work consists of corrupting
unions from within, and, of course, guards and replacements do not become
useful until the union has considerable power. But although more than justified
by the wording of the phrase, such a construction not only would destroy the
act but would be absurd because incapable of application. There is no practical
distinction between building and maintaining a union, and anything which
hampers the effectiveness of a union's activity necessarily decreases its appeal
to members and prospective members. As to the word, "right," it would not
seem to be a strained interpretation to say that strikebreaking does not inter-
fere with the right of organization but merely impedes the exercise of that right.
The National Labor Relations Board has ignored "right" in the corresponding
phrase of the Wagner Act,s6 but it invites inept construction, and the courts
have not understood the spirit of labor legislation as the Board apparently does.
s6 The phrase used by the NLRB has almost exclusively been "exercise of rights." See In
the Matter of Friedman-Harry Mark Clothing Co., Inc. and Amalgamated Clothing Workers
of American, case no C-5o, i Decisions and Orders of the National Labor Relations Board 432,
451 (1936).
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Finally it appears that only those who "transport" with intent to "employ"
the strikebreakers are affected by the act. Presumably designed to protect the
carrier, this provision seems clearly to provide a complete escape. If the strike-
breaking organization transports the men with no aid from the industry
management, and the management employs them with no aid from the strike-
breaking organization, there is no one who falls within the act. This is also true,
of course, where the recruitment was within the state or was so carefully
arranged that it appeared to be within the state, but that is an unavoidable
incident of the method used for inclusion within the commerce power. The
company owner will easily avoid responsibility, either by refraining from aiding
or abetting in the transportation, or, if "employ" is strictly construed, by not
entering into an employment relationship with the strikebreakers.ST The carrier
is amply protected by the "knowingly," and the use of "employ" is unfortunate
and unjustifiable.
As usual, however, criticism is easier than construction. The statute should
attack strikebreaking in its most vicious phase, where violence is contemplated on
both sides, and it should constitute so strong a deterrent that it need hardly ever
be enforced. To both of these goals the due process clause is a difficult hurdle.
The statute should be general enough to attack all the various forms of union-
breaking yet not so vague that it can be construed away. General or specific, it
will have to cover a number of fields which are as yet very imperfectly under-
stood. First of all, some basis must be found for federal regulation other than
transportation of the men. If the view of interstate commerce taken in the
Wagner Act decisionss8 is to stand, the federal power can be based on the
commerce of the employer, and the statute can be pointed directly at inter-
ference with the workers. If possible, it should attack the great strikebreaking
organizations with special force, either by prohibiting them completely in inter-
state commerce, as the Wilson Commission suggested, or by imposing heavier
penalties on them, or, possibly, by using the tax power to confiscate all of their
profits.s9 The strikebreakers, themselves, should not be immune, although their
penalties should, perhaps, be less harsh. It is improbable that the due process
difficulties of limiting an employer's power to protect his property would extend
to limitations upon strangers, the strikebreakers and their agencies. Indirect
V? Customarily the men are paid, armed, and captained by the agency, but housed and fed by
the company.
s
8 See note 55 supra.
ss Cf. Tax on Unjust Enrichment, 49 Stat. 1734 (1936) (8o% tax on "windfalls" resulting
from recovery of impounded tax payments when the AAA was held unconstitutional). See
Doremus v. United States, 249 U.S. 86 (i919) (prohibitory tax on narcotics held con-
stitutional); McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (904) (margarine tax constitutional). But
see Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (tax on child labor held unconstitution-
al); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922) (tax on "non-contract" grain exchanges held unconsti-
tutional). The Bailey and Hill cases are easily distinguishable, since there the rate of "taxa-
tion" bore no relationship to the evil attacked.
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restraints can be imposed by regulating the transportation of arms or by
regulating the use of arms which have been transported in interstate commerce.
The words, "right" and "employ," should be avoided and words like "strike-
breaking replacements" and "industrial spying" should be adopted in the hope
that the courts can work out adequate definitions. "Peaceful picketing" and
"organization" are far less satisfactory than the "concerted activities" of the
Wagner Act. At present the most important task is in pursuing investigations
like that of the La Follette Committee, since it is only by thorough under-
standing of what constitutes strikebreaking that it can be adequately defined
and, once proper definitions are formed, the most difficult drafting problem is
past.
